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Red, White, And Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law.
By Mark Tushnet. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England:
Harvard University Press, 1988. Pp. xiii, 328.
Reviewed by David Lyons*
Constitutional theory offers guidance for judicial review, usually by
defending or attacking an approach to constitutional interpretation. John
Hart Ely's defense of "representation-reinforcing" review1 exemplifies the
affirmative mode of interpretative advocacy. H. Jefferson Powell's
commentaries on originalism2 illustrate the negative mode. Theorists
sometimes recommend that cases raising constitutional questions be
disposed of without recourse to constitutional meaning. James Bradley
Thayer's call for extreme deference to the federal legislature3 and
Alexander Bickel's praise for "passive Ojudicial] virtues" 4 are sample
products of noninterpretative theorizing.
Mark Tushnet's new book 5 offers no such counsel. Mainly a critique
of interpretative theories, 6 its conclusions are profoundly skeptical.
Tushnet's central claim is that judicial review and constitutional theory
cannot possibly perform their assigned functions, and that liberalism is to
blame. This review will focus on those facets of the book.
L THE CENTRAL ARGUmENT
Tuslmet contends that "the aim of the Constitution is to prevent
tyranny." 7 Judicial review is supposed to prevent "the tyranny of the
* Professor of Law and Philosophy, Cornell University.
1. J.H. ELY, DEMOCRAcy AND DismusT (1980).

2. See, ag, Powell, The OriginalUnderstandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885

(1985).
3. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7

HARv. L Ray. 129 (1893).
4. A. BICKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEaOUS BRANCH (1962).
5. M. TUSHNEr, RED, WHTE, AND BLuE: A CRmCAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTr=tTONAL LAW
(1988).
6. Despite the subtitle, only the last third of the book considers constitutional doctrine.
Id. at 191-312. The rest of the book deals with general theory.
7. Id. at 179.
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majority" by constraining the legislature.8 This arrangement does not solve
but relocates the problem, by giving considerable power to unelected
judges. Constitutional theory is assigned the task of preventing "the
tyranny of the judges."9 To achieve this end, theory must provide criteria
of constitutional meaning to "guide and constrain judicial discretion"1 0 and
to monitor judicial performance. Tuslmet argues, however, that such
theories cannot succeed: "no available approach to constitutional law can
effectively restrain both legislators and judges: If we restrain the judges
we leave legislators unconstrained; if we restrain the legislators we let the
judges do what they want."" Tushnet makes his case mainly by examining
"grand theories," which seek interpretative guidance in the Constitution's
history," in principles of "representative democracy," 13 or in "moral
philosophy."1 4
Tushnet places within the "liberal tradition" all the theories of
judicial review that he examines.15 He understands this tradition to provide
the basic framework for American political thought. However, the liberal
tradition generates concern about legislative tyranny as well as the
dilemma of constraint. But the tradition has never exhausted American
political thought. A distinct tradition of "civic republicanism" persists.
Though far weaker than liberalism, its influence can be detected in the
Constitution.1 6
It should be noted that in referring to political traditions, Tushnet is
concerned not with "systematic, well-organized bodies of thought" but
rather with "amateur political theory," which provides "general
frameworks for orienting [everyday] thought about political life." 17
8. Id. at 16.
9. Id. at 16-17.
10. Id. at 112.
11. Id. at 313.
12. IM at 21-69.
13. Id at 70-107; see also J.H. ELY, supra note 1.
14. M. TusNr, supra note 5, at 108-46; see also R. DwoRI~N, TAING RioHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977); R. DwoRmN, A MATmR OF PFuNCzPLE (1985); R. DwoRMN, LAw's EMPIRE

(1986).

In the remainder of Part I, Tushnet considers abortive "anti-formalist" attempts to cope
with the "counter-majoritarian difficulty," M. TtsHNEr, supra note 5, at 147-68, and eclectic
"little" theories, whose strategy of "balancing" inevitably fails to provide constraints upon
the judiciary. Id. at 179-87. In Part II, Tushnet examines several areas of constitutional
doctrine and associated theories, including "structural review," id at 199-213, regulation of
the welfare bureaucracy, id at 214-46, religion, id at 247-76, commercial speech, id at 28993, and pornography, id at 293-311.
15. M. TusWNer, supra note 5, at 17.
16. Id. at 274.
17. Compare id at 5-6 (if this does not represent a change in focus from Tushnet's
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Throughout the book, Tushnet contrasts these two traditions. 8 To mention
just a few relevant points: liberalism regards people as predominantly
self-interested, political life as a competition for power, and public
institutions as threats to the individual. Republicanism stresses our
capacity for civic-minded motivation, envisions a greater scope for
cooperation and solidarity, and is less fearful of government. For our
purposes, the most significant contrast concerns the effect of these
traditions upon judicial review. Tushnet argues that liberalism makes
judicial review and its theory necessary but impossible, whereas
republicanism makes them possible but unnecessary.19
The argument goes something like this. Shared meanings and civicmindedness are needed to make judicial review work properly, but they
cannot endure under the conditions that sustain a liberal political outlook.
Because of this, liberalism generates reasonable concern about the abuse
of public power and thus perceives the need for judicial review. But as
judges and legislators lack a common conception of the public good and
a shared understanding of the Constitution, judicial review cannot be
expected to constrain legislators, and constitutional theory cannot be
expected to constrain judges to the degree required.
Judicial tyranny could be prevented, however, if judges shared a
conception of the public good, were capable of applying it in decisions,
and were determined to do so. This would be possible in a republican
community, for Tushnet understands republicanism in such terms.
Constitutional theory-that is, an effectively constraining approach to
constitutional interpretation-would then be possible. For Tushnet
assumes that a constitution would be interpreted so that it served the
public good as mutually conceived. But judicial review would then be
virtually unnecessary, because legislators would likewise share the same
understanding of the public good, and they too would be sufficiently
motivated to serve it.20

earlier articles, it is at least a welcome clarification and a kinder, gentler tone) with Tushnet,
Darkness on the Edge of Tow The Contributionsof John HartEly to ConstitutionalTheory,
89 YALE LJ. 1037 (1980) [hereinafter Darkness on the Edge]; Tushnet, Dia-Tribe,78 MICH.
L REy. 694 (1980); Tushnet, The Dilemnas of Liberal Constitutionalirm, 42 Oio ST. LJ.
411 (1981); Tushnet, Followingthe Rules Laid Down:A Critiqueof Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles,96 HARy. L REv. 781 (1983); Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An
Interpretationof Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 Tx. L. REv. 1307 (1979).
18. See, eag, M. TusHNTgr, supra note 5, at 4-17, 313-18.
19. Id. at viii, 146, 313, 317.
20. For Tushnet's discussion of a "culture of mutual forbearance," see id. at 275-76.
Tushnet seems to understand republican political culture as including whatever is necessary
to achieve genuine consensus.
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II. GRAND THEORIES
Of all the theories considered by Tushnet, original intent is the one
most often defended by its partisans as capable of constraining the
judiciary. 21 Tushnet's primary complaint is that it fails to do so. As a
consequence of "historical ambiguity, inference from limited evidence, and
social change," what the framers intended is at best unclear.22 Reasonable
disagreement about original intent is inevitable, and it cannot be
eliminated. Under this criterion, we should expect persisting disagreement
about what the Constitution means. As competing interpretations will be
defensible, it will be easy for judges to decide in accordance with their
predilections.
Tushnet concludes that originalism cannot prevent judicial
3
tyranny.2
Tushnet provides an excellent summary of and commentary on Ely's
proposal that we interpret the Constitution so that it serves its
commitment to effective representation. Tushnet argues that courts using
this theory can prevent one kind of tyranny "only by creating the risk of
the other."2 4 If courts attack only "formal" obstacles to representation,
they will not constrain the legislature. But courts cannot attack "informal"
obstacles without making complex judgments of fact, about which
reasonable people can disagree. That approach would leave the judges
unconstrained.
Tushnet provides a less sympathetic account of judicial review
involving the application of moral principles. Because abstract principles
have unclear implications, interpretation based upon them would generate
reasonable disagreement and would thus fail to constrain the judges.
A striking feature of this book is Tushnet's lack of concern about the
soundness of the theories he examines. He devotes little space to the
question whether any of them are correct about constitutional meaning.2s
That is not his point. He is concerned with a theory's capacity for keeping
judges in check while enabling them to constrain the legislators. That is
not the sole basis on which he criticizes the various theories he considers,
but it is the crucial, central line of argument in Part I of his book.
21. See R. BFRGER, GovERNMENr By JUDICtARY (1977).
22. M. TusHNEr, supra note 5, at 34.
23. Id at 35.
24. Id. at 73.
25. Tushnet does not ignore the issue entirely. For example, he entertains the notion
that we have agreed to be guided by the intentions of the framers, and proceeds quickly to
discredit it. Id at 25-26. He notes that a moral theory used in constitutional interpretation
cannot effectively constrain unless it is "rule-oriented," and he appears to agree with the
objection that "rule-oriented moral philosophies are not good ones no matter what the rules
are." Id at 112-13.
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It may be relevant here that Tushnet draws from Legal Realism the
lesson that "judicial review doesn't matter. . . . If law is only power
dressed up in ways that satisfy our demand for neutrality, ultimately the
powerful will prevail no matter what a few eccentric judges occasionally
say." 26 Tushnet does not explicitly endorse these claims, but he appears to
accept them? Given that "realistic" way of thinking, it does not matter
very much whether law even has enough determinate meaning to provide
raw material for unique, sound interpretation. What the law requires and
allows cannot be determined with certainty, so it is readily interpreted
according to the predisposition of its interpreter. If constitutional theories
cannot prevent this, that is the important point, not whether one theory
or another might tell us what the Constitution truly means.

III. EFFECTIVE CONSTRAINT

Tushnet assumes that, in order to provide adequate constraint, a
constitutional theory must have crystal-clear implications about
constitutional meaning. It must provide interpretative rules that leave little
room for the exercise of judgment.
It seems unlikely that any theory meeting such stringent specifications
could gain wide acceptance. Plausible guidelines for constitutional
interpretation are unlikely to be mechanical. If theorists aim at sound
interpretation, we should expect continued disagreement about the proper
reading of the Constitution. What then is the point of Tushnet's critique?
Tushnet believes that our political community is more like that
assumed by liberalism than like that of the republican ideal. His reasoning
yields the conclusion that our political community cannot have mechanical
review or corresponding interpretive guidelines. But he is not yet in a
position to conclude that effective constraint on judicial review is
impossible. To reach that conclusion, he must assume that effective
constraint requires mechanical review. Why should that be necessary?
How could one defend the claim that judicial review and
constitutional theory require mechanical guidelines? One possible strategy
of argument is to show that judicial review does not in fact reliably
enforce constitutional limits on governmental actions. To attempt this, one
would have to determine what those limits are, which would require a
criterion of constitutional meaning that has been verified as sound.
26. Id. at 198.
27. Id at 213 ("The remainder of this book tries to develop [the Realist]'perception
by examining the processes by which power operates to shape our understanding of the
social world.").
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Tushnet does not pretend to have any interpretative theory, sound or
otherwise. Does his argument then fail?
Tushnet's argument could be developed further. Consider Tushnet's
reference to legislative and judicial tyranny. The term "tyranny" might
easily be misconstrued. Here it has a standard but limited reference to the
unwarranted appropriation of political power. This is what happens when
the legislature violates limits on its constitutional authority -what judicial
review is supposed to prevent. Moreover, this is what happens when the
judiciary fails to discharge its responsibility to enforce constitutional limits
on legislative authority -what constitutional theory is supposed to prevent.
Tushnet can be understood to hold that, in our political culture,
constitutional theory cannot be relied upon to prevent decision making in
the judicial branch that breaches its responsibility to enforce the
Constitution-in other words, it cannot be relied upon to prevent
legislative tyranny- and that, partly for this reason, judicial review cannot
be relied upon to prevent decision making by the legislative branch that
abuses its authority-in other words, it also cannot be relied upon to
prevent legislative tyranny.2s
IV. WHAT Is To BE DONE?
Tushnet may be said to favor republicanism, but he does not
propose that the dilemma of judicial review be resolved by reviving that
political outlook. For one thing, republicanism by itself is an inadequate
social theory. "Each tradition captures important and valuable aspects of
life that no sound understanding of political activity can ignore." 3° "[J]ust
as the republican tradition correctly emphasizes our mutual dependence,
the liberal tradition correctly emphasizes our individuality and the threats
we pose to one another." 31 Second, republicanism could not be revived
without transforming society,32 e.g., equalizing wealth. Third, the social
changes that are necessary to prevent tyranny in the broadest sense, e.g.,
28. Darkness on the Edge, supra note 17, at 1061 ("the tyranny that can result when
someone motivated by arbitrary desire occupies a position of power").
29. Id at 17, 275. However, Tushnet does not favor its conservative version, which
restricts political power to a limited class of propertied citizens. Id
30. Id at 7.
31. Id at 23. Liberalism and republicanism resemble the conflicting moral positions,
usually called "individualism" and "altruism," that some Critical Legal Scholars have
perceived underlying conflicting sets of rules and precedents in every branch of law. See
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L Ray. 1685 (1976).
32. M. TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 145, 148.
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by securing a truly democratic distribution of political power, would solve
greater and more pressing problems than those of judicial review. Tushnet
believes that the solutions to such problems are to be found, not in better
constitutional theory, but in a transformed society that exemplifies the
best of the republican ideals.33 This requires political organization and
action.
All that may be true and is important. I am concerned, however, with
an inference that might be drawn, especially given Tustmet's agnosticism
about constitutional interpretation and his apparent skepticism regarding
determinate constitutional meaning.34 His argument might be seen as
discouraging efforts to secure constitutional rights, both because he might
be taken as doubting that propositions regarding constitutional law can be
true or as holding that pressing claims of constitutional rights detract
from the work that is required to transform society.
Today, as often in the past, it would be foolish to regard the federal
courts as reliable trustees of constitutional rights, just as it would be
foolish to suppose that mere judicial acknowledgement of them would
solve the most pressing problems of our society. Nevertheless, it would be
a serious error to waive constitutional rights. Experience provides us with
reason to believe that the struggle to secure important rights can be
instrumental for solving the problems of injustice, cruelty, and domination
in our society. Tushnet's agnosticism about constitutional interpretation
and his apparent skepticism about constitutional rights unfortunately
might encourage the opposite view.

33. Id at 145.
34. Id at 7,23. Tushnet's comments on liberalism and republicanism imply his concern
about the soundness of such theories, thus his contrasting attitude toward theories of
constitutional interpretation would seem to indicate skepticism about the determinacy of the
constitutional meaning or the possibility of sound interpretation.

